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Transnational Alignment of

Nongovernmental Organizations for
Global Environmental Action
ABSTRACT

This Note proposes an alternative to the current international legal
system for addressing the worldwide environmental crisis. The author
describes the conditions of the environment and argues that the current
legal system is incapable of responding to the already severe global environmental crisis. The author suggests that a network of environmental
nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) can obtain results that are currently beyond the capabilities of either individual states or traditional
international organizations. The main function of this type of network
would be to collect and disseminate information to facilitate environmental action. The author also proposes a specific constructionfor an environmental network. This network could act as a proponent of environmentally sound practices and as a watchdog for damaging events.
Finally, the author suggests that an environmental NGO network could
be most effective if it is recognized by, but not controlled by, an international organization or agreement. Regardless of the methods used, the
author urges that this environmental action must occur immediately.
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INTRODUCTION

In January 1986, environmentalists from Hungary, Austria and West
Germany held an open meeting in a Budapest restaurant and signed a
statement declaring that they would "use all democratic, peaceful and constitutional means" to change the Hungarian and Austrian governments'
decision to build the Nagymaros [Danube River Project] Dam. It was the
first time that independent "Green" movements from East and West
agreed to conduct a joint campaign in a Communist country.'
The view that civilization can master the environment threatens humanity's ability to control the future quality of life on the planet.2
Known repercussions of existing global environmental damage, even if
halted at its current level, may significantly alter life on earth. Further,
significant latent ramifications may remain unnoticed for years. The ripple effect of these environmental changes ultimately could reshape not
only human lifestyles, but also the balance of power in the international
arena by modifying entire ecosystems and shifting the distribution of natural resources.
The present structure for global environmental protection has
prompted many critics to call for drastic innovations within the existing
framework of international law and organizations and even for radical
restructuring of the entire international system. Most of, these recommendations exhibit visionary concepts, but they do not account for the
frailty of the human character.
This Note will describe an alternative approach to the environmental
crisis that is outside the existing structure of the international system,
but does not threaten that system. Proposals that people can implement
immediately, without significantly restructuring existing institutions,
may hasten ultimate acceptance of more far-reaching and perhaps permanent solutions. First, this Note discusses the environmental constraints
facing humanity, the perceived inadequacy of the current structure of
sovereign states within international law, and some of the proposed solutions. This Note next broadly describes a transnational approach to environmental action. This approach outlines methods that would stimulate
the proper functioning of an international system as it presently exists,
yet would not implicate the international law concept of "sovereignty."

1. HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, FROM BELOW: INDEPENDENT PEACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR 66-67 (Oct. 1987).

2. See Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland-A Proposal, 48 FOR. AFF. 393
(1970), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 107 (L. Jaffe and L. Tribe eds.
1971).

TRANSNATIONAL ALIGNMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs

19911

This broad approach allows for many different avenues for the development of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and interorganizational
networks. By operating outside the sphere of sovereignty, the transnational NGO format may be more palatable to nations as an opportunity
for immediate environmental action. Finally, this Note proposes a particular alignment of NGOs that could act as a catalyst for environmental
action by the current international system of sovereign states. This alignment of NGOs could act as a "conscience" of the traditional sovereignty
system. Time, however, is the paramount consideration in any proposal
for environmental reform because time is not only indifferent in its passing, but also completely irreplaceable, making it the most precious resource of all.
II.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

A.

The Status of the Environment

The earth is a finite resource,' and the current scale of economic development may reach the point that "impoverishes rather than enriches." 4 Ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain, deforestation, and
desertification are issues of global proportions, 5 posing potentially devastating effects on the world environment. Ozone depletion6 and the resultant increase in ultraviolet radiation could increase skin cancer,' damage
human eyesight and immune systems, 8 destroy major elements in the
food chain,9 and reduce food production.' 0 The effects of global warming' could include flooded coastal cities from melting polar icecaps,' 2

3.

See Chayes, International Institutionsfor the Environment, in LAW, INSTITUHargrove ed. 1972).
4. Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World Countries:
Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603, 603
(1988).
5. See Taubenfeld, The Atmosphere: Change, Politics and World Law, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 469, 474 (1981); see also Handl, supra note 4, at 603.
6. For a description of the process of ozone depletion, see Kindt & Menefee, The
Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion in International Environmental Law and Policy,
24 TEx. INT'L L.J. 261, 262-267 (1989).
7. See Ho, U.N. Recognition of the Human Right to Environmental Protection, 2
TIONS, & THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 3 (J.

EARTH L.J. 225, 237 (1976).

8.

See Note, The Montreal Protocol: The First Step Toward Protectingthe Global

Ozone Layer, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 793, 808 (1988).

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Ozone depletion also contributes to global warming. For a description of the
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imperiled fresh water supplies, 3 and drastically altered world food production.14 Acid rain' kills lakes and forests,' 6 damages outdoor structures,' 7 and can contaminate underground supplies of drinking and irrigation water.' 8 Unabated deforestation may cause the extinction of
twenty percent of all species on earth by the turn of the century. 9 The
loss of the biological diversity of tropical rain forests20 would be particularly disturbing, since most new medicines and natural pesticides originate from newly discovered species in tropical rain forests. 2'
Aside from physical and biological effects, environmental degradation
also may have political consequences. Environmental deterioration and
the depletion of natural resources, for example, could lead to international tension,22 as political strife is often present in areas of significant
environmental stress.23 Despite the presence of these dangers, some pre-

global warming process, see Nanda, Global Warming and InternationalEnvironmental
Law-A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375, 375 (1989); Note, Carbon
Dioxide's Threat to Global Climate: An InternationalSolution, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L.
389, 390-92 (1981).
12. See Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 477.
13. See Weiss, A Resource Management Approach to Carbon Dioxide During the
Century of Transition, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 487, 488 (1981).
14. See Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 477; see also Note, supra note 11, at 391.
Though the wheat belt of Canada and the United States could become a dust bowl, the
Soviet Union could increase food production from presently unarable land. See Weiss,
supra note 13, at 499; see also Stevens, In a Warming World, Who Comes Out Ahead?,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1991, at B5, col. 1.
15. For a discussion of acid precipitation or deposition, see Canada-UnitedStates
Institute Proceedings,5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 1 (1982). See generally NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, ANN. REP., 1989 AND FINDINGS UPDATE (1990).

16. See Roberts, The TransnationalImplications of Acid Rain-Introductory Remarks, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 2, 5-6 (1982).
17. Id.
18. Id. The national economy of Canada is severely threatened by acid rain's potential disruption of its tourist, timber, and commercial fishing industries. Id.
19. See Handl, supra note 4, at 605 & n.9.
20. Rain forests may contain 50% of all species on the planet. See Recent Development, Environmental Law-Brazil Enacts New Protectionsfor the Amazon Rain Forest, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 509-10 (1989).
21. See id. at 510.
22. See Handl, supra note 4, at 605; see also Mathews, Tackling the Institutional
Barriers, 15 E.P.A. J., July-Aug. 1989, at 11. The unrest in El Salvador and Haiti may
spring from environmental as much as political problems. See Handl, supra note 4, at
605-06.
23. See R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET 295 (1971). The devastated environment of Poland has placed the health of one-third of its entire population at risk. See
HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 91. The epic drought in East Africa, which
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fer to delay action until all gaps in knowledge are filled. The uncertainty
in the evidence, however, is such that "we would probably be even more
24
worried than we are now if we knew more than we do."
B.

The Status of InternationalLaw

The earth's ecosystem, an interrelated whole of air, water, soil, and
wildlife, 25 is completely unregulated by civilization's artificial political
boundaries.2 6 Those who threaten the ecosystem anywhere, threaten it
everywhere, 27 making unilateral attempts by individual nations to address environmental problems ineffectual.2 8 One possibility for a uniform
policy, the international legal system, currently is inadequate to cope
29
with "the environmental specters at hand."
Critics of the international legal system primarily have blamed the
doctrine of state sovereignty, the foundation of international law, for the
stalemate in environmental action. 30 "[N]ational sovereignty implies the
full legal control over national resources."'" Because the element of soy-

aroused a massive and heavily publicized Western relief movement for the region's starving masses in 1984, also could be a principal cause of the rebellion in Ethiopia that
thwarted relief efforts. For a discussion of the rebellion in areas of desertification, see
Schulz, Mechanization and Marginal Lands in Southwest Asia, in DESERTIFICATION
AND DEVELOPMENT: DRYLAND ECOLOGY IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

36 (B. Spooner &

H. Mann eds. 1982). For a discussion of the Ethiopian relief effort in 1984, see Johnston, Systemic Environmental Damage: The Challenge to InternationalLaw and Organization, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 255, 260 n.16 (1985).
24. Clapham, Coals, Cars and Questions: Knowns and Unknowns About Acid
Rain, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 32, 38 (1982).
25. See A. Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 13, 15 (1976).
26. See Anand, Development and Environment: The Case of the Developing Countries, 20 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1980).
27. See Kennan, supra note 2, at 107.
28. See Note, supra note 11, at 401.
29. Henson & Hively, Toward an International Law of the Atmosphere, 77 AM.
SCIENTIST 324 (1989); see also A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 31 (1983). Even the recent Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, done Sept. 16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987), to the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, done Mar. 22, 1985, reprinted in 26
I.L.M. 1516 (1987), which imposes significant restrictions on the production of ozonedepleters, has been criticized as inadequate and defective. See Note, supra note 8, at 79394, 799.
30. See C. JENKS, LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 31 (1967); see also W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 365-66 (1964).
31. W. FREIDMANN, supra note 30, at 17. Nations treasure the right to exploit state
resources, see Weiss, supra note 13, at 504, and the sovereign right to exploit state re-
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ereignty is embedded in current international agreements that address
the environment, 32 states currently may preside over wholesale degeneration of the environment with virtually no fear of reprisal.3 3 State sovereignty has "encouraged competition among nations to exploit natural re'
sources on a global scale." 34
This competitive economic development
among nations has frustrated international consensus on environmental
objectives.35 The international structure promotes competition between
nations, but environmental protection requires cooperation among
nations.3 6
37
Nations, however, generally act only when it is in their interest.
When weighing the immediate economic future against the entire
planet's distant prospects, nations often choose self-serving present goals,
to the long-term detriment of the environment. 8 Yet, "no effective protection can be obtained if governments ...

remain the sole judges of their

interests and responsibilities in environmental policy matters, and if the
only enforcement of international environmental agreements remains
that administered by self-interested national governments. ' 39 Since nasources is strong in both civil and common law states, see W.
RIGHTS AND

ENVIRONMENT:

THE NEED

FOR INTERNATIONAL

GORMLEY,

HUMAN
37

CO-OPERATION

(1976).
32. See Vienna Convention for the Protection f the Ozone Layer, supra note 29;
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, done June
16, 1972, principle 21, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT-TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 118, 120 (B. Riister & B. Simma eds.
1975). This Declaration is the environment's equivalent to the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
33. See A. SPRINGER, supra note 29, at 31; see also Robinson, Introduction:Emerging InternationalEnvironmental Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 229, 245 (1981).
34.

L.

CALDWELL, IN

DEFENSE OF EARTH: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE

109 (1972).
35. See Howland, Chernobyl and Acid Rain Deposition:An Analysis of the Failure
of European Cooperation to Protect the Shared Environment, 2 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 1, 29 (1988).
36. See id. at 26; see also R. FALK, supra note 23, at 326-67.
37. See Rosencranz, The InternationalLaw and Politics of Acid Rain, 10 DEN. J.
BIOSPHERE

INT'L L.

& POL'Y 511, 514 (1981). Further, state freedom cannot be restricted except by

consent or agreement. See Gaines, InternationalPrinciplesfor TransnationalEnvironmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30
HARV. INT'L

L.J. 311, 316 (1989).

CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 110-11; see also A. SPRINGER, supra note
29, at 31-32.
39. L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 154. At the 1972 United Nations Conference

38.

See L.

on the Human Environment at Stockholm, resulting in the formation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the developed nations argued for strong pollution control while the developing nations vehemently protested that strong pollution con-
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tions fear that environmental endeavors will jeopardize their competitive41
4
ness in the world economy, " the classic prisoner's dilemma develops.
The unsavory option left to nations is unilateral environmental regulation compensated by quotas, tariffs, or subsidies to protect economic
competitiveness.4 2
The constraints on developing nations, which traditionally favor economic goals over environmental protection, 4 exemplify the dilemma created by the doctrine of national sovereignty. Developing nations often
believe that the developed nations not only have caused the bulk of global
environmental deterioration, 44 but also have environmentally exploited
the developing nations by extracting natural resources 45 and dumping
products restricted in developed nations into Third World markets.46
One author summarizes the concerns of developing nations in five major points. First, developing nations fear that developed countries,
through "rigorous environmental standards" and "neo-protectionism,"

trol would strangle development. Later, at the 1982 Nairobi Session of a Special
Character at UNEP headquarters, a celebration of the Stockholm Conference's tenth
anniversary, the positions of the developed and developing nations were reversed. See
Development, The United Nations Environment Programme After a Decade: The Nairobi Session of a Special Character,May 1981, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269, 28081 & n.73 (1983).
40. See Howland, supra note 35, at 25; see also A. Kiss, supra note 25, at 14.
41. In a prisoner's dilemma situation, each party would gain the most if all parties
cooperated. Each party, however, is uncertain whether the others will cooperate, and if
less than all the parties cooperate, each party will gain more by not acting at all. "Consequently, the individually rational outcome is that none of the parties cooperate." Hahn &
Richards, The Internationalizationof Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.
421, 429 (1989). For an example of the prisoner's dilemma, see Auto Industry Supports
Production Freeze to Protect Ozone Layer, If Globally Accepted, 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 6, at 275 (June 10, 1987).
42. See Howland, supra note 35, at 26. Both protective tariffs and quotas may raise
problems under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and may create
international tension. Id. at 27; see also A. SPRINGER, supra note 29, at 34. For an
example of international posturing because of unilateral environmental action, see U.S.
Ozone Protection Policy Sabotaged, Natural Resources Defense Council Says, 10 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 196-97 (May 13, 1987).
43. See Sinjela, Developing Countries Perceptionsof Environmental Protection and
Economic Development, 24 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 489, 496 (1984); see also Leonard &
Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Political
Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 282-83 (1981).
44. See Sinjela, supra note 43, at 491, 497; see also W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at
8.
45. See Sinjela, supra note 43, at 495.
46. See id. at 496.
47. W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 8.
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will restrict the international trade of goods from developing nations.
Second, developed countries will depend less on raw materials from developing countries because of increased interest in recycling and will demand fewer agricultural products in which pesticide residue is found because of a new emphasis on non-polluting technology. Third, developing
countries fear their developmental aid will be reduced when developed
countries concentrate on their own domestic environmental issues.
Fourth, developed countries may dictate environmental standards to developing countries without regard to the effects of those standards on the
developing countries. Finally, developing countries fear, that developed
countries will impose their own priorities of environmental issues on the
48

developing countries.

Facing suffocating poverty, developing nations perceive the expense of
environmental protection as a threat to desperate attempts at improving
citizens' lives or as an "unaffordable luxur[y]. ' '49 To overcome the environmental pollution resulting from poverty, such as sewage problems,5
developing nations also are confronted with technological advances that
can "endanger the very natural resource base upon which the long-term
prospects of societal well-being rest."51 Thus, Third World nations are
facing a spiraling decline in their environment and an unprecedented
ecological disaster.52
State sovereignty also plagues international organizations such as the
United Nations. 53 Because intergovernmental international organizations
54
are effective only to the extent that nations consent to any endeavor,
these organizations are subservient to the will of member nations. 55 Na-

48.

Id.

49. Garcia & Howland, Cuban Environmental Law: An Analysis From the International Right to Developmental Perspective, 2 LA RAZA L.J. 62, 65 (1988). "[P]ersons
who do not know where their next meal is going to come from cannot be expected to
worry too much about ... the environment." Sinjela, supra note 43, at 493.
50. See Sinjela, supra note 43, at 497; see also Handl, supra note 4, at 607.
51. Handl, supra note 4, at 607. Developing nations hope that the development dilemma will fade as knowledge is gleaned from the mistakes of the developed nations'
experience. See Robinson, Problems of Definition and Scope, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, &
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, 44, 49 (J. Hargrove ed. 1977); see also Sinjela, supra
note 43, at 497. A country's natural resource base includes basic environmental elements
such as air, water, soil, and wildlife.
52. See Handl, supra note 4, at 604. See generally Anand, supra note 26, at 1-19.
53. See Editorial Comment, HABITAT and the Human Environment: Challenge to
the Non-Governmental Company, 2 EARTH L.J. 107, 108 (1976); see also W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 135-36.
54. See W..FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 34-35.
55. See J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS
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tions are reluctant to submit to the control of an international authority,
despite the threat to the global environment.56 "The UN has neither the
resources, the consensus, nor the prestige to impose its will on its
stronger members."5 7 Accordingly, the self-interested politics of state sovereignty undermine the objectives of the United Nations specialized
agencies, converting them into mere pawns in a political chess game.5"
One specialized agency, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP),59 has the mandate to serve as a catalyst for environmental action.60 UNEP fulfills this mandate through (1) global monitoring of the
environment through the Earthwatch Program, (2) environmental planning and management using the information gathered by Earthwatch,
and (3) the disseminiation of environmental information worldwide.6 '
Environmentalists have been disappointed by UNEP,62 however, because
the same tensions and clashing interests of state sovereignty that plague
the United Nations also render UNEP impotent.6 3 UNEP's most critical
failures are its inability to raise public awareness and its lack of influ64
ence in national political forums.

(1979).
56. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 219.
57. R. FALK, supra note 23, at 315. The United Nations also "suffers from a tendency to reach decisions on the basis of political, ethnic, and religious affiliations rather
than through an interpretation of the facts." Id.
58. See D. WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS-THE SYSTEM IN CRISIS 233 (1987). The United Nations Specialized Agencies
are in a
[s]tate of "crisis" [from] the culmination of certain factors which have long operated: the use of Specialized Agency forums to discuss subjects not clearly related to
their functional responsibilities; the lack of co-ordination between the Agencies
based on lack of authority in the United Nations; declining standards among the
staff; voting procedures unrelated to national strength or to financial contributions;
and, above all, profound differences of view among the members of the United
Nations about the aims and methods of economic and social policy.
Id.
59. See supra note 39.
60. See Editorial Comment, supra note 53, at 312.
61. See Note, The Challenge of InternationalEnvironmental Management: A Critique of the United Nations Environment Programme, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 270-72
(1978).
62. See Howland, supra note 35, at 10; see diso A. SPRINGER, supra note 29, at 33.
63. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 136; see also Editorial Comment, supra
note 53, at 312-13; Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a
Great Notion?, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335, 340 (1984).
64. See Note, supra note 61, at 280. Even UNEP's most successful achievement,
Earthwatch, has proven only minimally effective. Id.; see also J. SCHNEIDER, supra note
55, at 125-26. UNEP also suffers from a lack of funding, and any actions that offend a
AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 80-81
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The United Nations has attempted to create an interactive partnership
with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are not formally connected with either a particular government or the United Nations by
granting consultative status to these NGOs.6 5 This system of consultative
NGOs is in a state of crisis, however, because it still operates within the
confines of state sovereignty. As a result, the NGOs have virtually no
influence in United Nations policymaking.6 6 Political constraints pervade
the system, and most government delegates do not even bother to read
material submitted by NGOs. 6 7 It is doubtful that NGOs can contribute

to international policy within the confines of an intergovernmental organization 8 so long as their efforts are still filtered through an organization dominated by state sovereignty. These consultative NGOs are directing their actions to the wrong audience, an audience of governments.
C.

Current Proposals

The primary current environmental reforms proposed for the international legal system will affect litigation. These proposed reforms include
shifts in established burdens of proof, 9 a form of universal jurisdiction
over environmental violations litigable by any nation, 70 and standing
71
before international courts for NGOs and other non-state actors.
Traditionally, under the state sovereignty doctrine, only states have
standing to litigate before an international court,7 ' and states must consent to jurisdiction for each specific claim. 7 3 States, however, rarely con-

contributing nation could result in a withdrawal of financial support. See Development,
supra note 39, at 284. Former United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Administrator William Ruckelshaus described United Nations funding for the environment as "laughable." Ruckelshaus Sees Self-Interest as Key to Improving Global Environment, 12 Int'l Evn't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 234, 235 (May 10, 1989).
65. See Gunter, Toward a Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations
and Non-Governmental Organizations?,10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 557, 559 (1977).
66. Id. at 558.
67. Id. at 578-82. NGOs denounce the artificially-tiered system of participation
within the United Nations as a divide and conquer policy. Id. The participatory rights of
consultative NGOs are categorized by the function, subject matter, or representative capacity of each NGO. Id. at 561. The power of NGOs is further circumscribed because
they may not criticize United Nations member governments by name. Id. at 578.
68. Id. at 586.
69. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 38-39.
70. See J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 130.
71. See id. at 130-31; see also W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 225.
72. See Sands, The Environment, Community, and InternationalLaw, 30 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 393, 397 (1989).
73. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 219-20.
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sent to jurisdiction for environmental claims. 4 States also are reluctant
to bring environmental claims for political reasons or because it could
establish precedents that could be used against them in the future. 5 In
general, international environmental litigants face almost insurmountable
obstacles, including proving the occurrence of harm, 7 delineating causation from other ecological influences, 77 calculating the value of the damages to the environment,7 ' and the inability of most remedies to satisfactorily compensate for the abuse to the environment. 9 The gradual
evolution of reform in customary international law may be too slow to
protect the environment adequately." "The broader international effort
to improve our stewardship of this ...

ecosphere must find the power it

needs outside the law of liability and compensation." 81
74. Id. at 220.
75. See Sands, supra note 72, at 393, 406-07.
76. See Howland, supra note 35, at 31; see also W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 38.
77. See Nanda, supra note 11, at 384; see also Howland, supra note 35, at 32;
Comment, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution:Meeting the
Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 461 (1989).
78. See Sands, supra note 72, at 407; see also Rosencranz, supra note 37, at 518.
79. See A. SPRINGER, supra note 29, at 32.
80. See id. at 31.
81. Gaines, supra note 37, at 349. For more extensive studies of environmental liability and dispute resolution, see generally J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION (1972); Beers, Standing and Related ProceduralHurdles in Environmental Litigation, 1J. ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 65 (1986); Bilder, An Overview
of InternationalDispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1986);
Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of InternationalAdjudication, 1
EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 131 (1987); Chester, Remedies in Canadian
Courts, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 85 (1982); Hassler & O'Connor, Woodsy Witchdoctors Versus
Judicial Guerrillas: The Role and Impact of Competing Interest Groups in Environmental Litigation, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 487 (1986); Herzberg, Remedies in
American Courts, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 91 (1982); Partan, The "Duty to Inform" in International Environmental Law, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 43 (1988); Stein, The Settlement of
Environmental Disputes: Towards a System of Flexible Dispute Settlement, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 283 (1985); Sviridoff, Recent Trends in Resolving Interpersonal, Community, and EnvironmentalDisputes, 35 ARB. J. 3, 7-8 (1980); Wilcox, The
Role of Environmental Groups in Litigation, 10 ADELAIDE L. REV. 41 (1985); Note,
InternationalLiabilityfor NuclearPollution, 11 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 75 (1987);
Note, On the Brink of an Ecological Calamity: Acid Rain, Transboundary Air Pollution and EnvironmentalLaw in West Germany, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 325,
350-57 (1985) [hereinafter On the Brink of an Ecological Calamity]; Comment, Resolving InternationalEnvironmental Disputes Between Private Parties and States, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 81 (1986).
For an interesting comparison of civil and common law, see Merryman, On the Convergence and Divergence of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L.
357 (1981).
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Another popular proposal suggests that environmental degradation
raises fundamental issues of human rights law.82 An exception to the
rule against international standing for non-state entities exists for human
rights violations, allowing individual persons to litigate this type of claim
before international courts.8" The Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment maintains that "[m]an has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life,
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing."8' 4 It has also been proclaimed that "[t]he right to live is the right
from which all other rights stem."8 " United Nations recognition of an
interconnection between human rights and a healthy environment would
Rights to include enenable the United Nations Commission on Human
86
scope.
broad
its
within
violations
vironmental
Many other innovative options abound.8 7 Proposals concerning regional intergovernmental organizations or new organs within the United
Nations,88 however, still operate within the constraints of state sovereignty.8 9 Thus, reform for environmental action must look beyond the
boundaries of state sovereignty.

82. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31; see also Ho, supra note 7.
83. See Howland, supra note 35, at 30, 36.
84. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
supra note 32, principle 1.
85. Declaration of the Hague, Mar. 11, 1989, reprintedin Sands, supra note 72, at
417.
86. See Ho, supra note 7, at 228. Another suggestion is to transform the United
Nations Trusteeship Council into a United Nations Human Rights and Environment
Council. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 129, 229-30.
87. Some of these other approaches to international environmental issues include intergenerational environmental trust funds, see R. FALK, supra note 23, at 334-40; individual state custodianship of the environment through powers delegated on behalf of the
world community, see Chayes, supra note 3, at 12-15; a United Nations agency for
environmental dispute settlement and a United Nations Environmental Councilship, see
L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 162-69; a United Nations authority for environmental

protection, see 24 Nations Call for Global Protection of Environment by 'Powerful'
U.N. Authority, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 176 (Apr. 12, 1989); an international fund for financing environmental technology in developing nations, see Nations
Back Tougher CFC Measures, but Decline Setting up Climate Fund, 12 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 225, 226 (May 10, 1989); state responsibility, see Howland, supra note
35, at 34; equitable use, see Weiss, Conservation and Equity Between Generations, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1984); insurance, see J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 108-10, 131-32; and environmental degradation as an international crime, see Howland, supra note 35, at 34.
88. See R. FALK, supra note 23, at 334-40.
89. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 34-35.
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TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL CONSENSUS

A.

Transnationalism

The technical definition of "international" is contact between state
governments. 0 Professor Jessup coined the term "transnational" to embrace the more frequent nongovernmental contacts that "transcend national frontiers."'" Transnationalism92 destroys the fiction, created by internationalism, that the sovereign state symbolizes a nation's government
and populace as a single entity.9" Instead, state governments must address a multitude of social concerns while subject to an array of political
pressures and constituencies.94 Thus, governmental action sweeps
broadly, sacrificing "depth, objectivity, and efficiency." 95 Even an environmentally-oriented government may be trapped politically by the demands of a diverse national constituency. 6 Therefore, environmental advocacy must recast its image so it is no longer the separate concern of a
distinct individual constituency fighting for limited government attention.
Environmental action must take a transnational approach to become a
concern that pervades every sector of each national constituency.

90.

P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 (1956).

91.

Id. International relations denote co-existence; transnational relations suggest co-

operation. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 37. Nongovernmental entities include
individuals, corporations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other private groups. See P. JEssuP, supra note 90, at 2-4. A nongovernmental organization (NGO), acting in more than one state, is by definition a transnational
entity.
92. For purposes of this Note, transnational relations will encompass "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central
foreign policy organs of governments ....

Thus, a transnational interaction may involve

governments, but it may not involve only governments: Nongovernmental actors must
also play a significant, role." Nye & Keohane, Transnational Relations and World
Politics: An Introduction, 25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 329, 331-32 (1971).
93. See, e.g., id. at 724 ("[Olver the bulk of recorded history man has organized
himself for political purposes on bases other than those now subsumed under the concepts 'state' and 'nation-state.' "); see also W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 247.

94. See Sands, supra note 72, at 397; see also Slouka, InternationalEnvironmental
Controls in the Scientific Age, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, & THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
208, 221 (J.Hargrove ed. 1972).
95.

Frantz, The Role of NGOs in the Strengthening of Civil Society, 15 WORLD

DEv. 121, 123 (Autumn Supp. 1987).

96. See R. FALK, supra note 23, at 417; see also Leonard & Morell, supra note 43,
at 305.
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The Basic Functions of TransnationalNetworks

Transnationalism is the preeminent vehicle for building a global environmental consensus. 97 An environmental consensus requires research
and information. 8 To facilitate this consensus, a centralized entity, such
as an international environmental network of NGOs, could function as a
clearinghouse and focal point for environmental issues. This network
could take on many forms, but it should fulfill certain basic functions,
including gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information on a
global scale.9 9 This network should have a central data bank that would
collect, catalog, store, and verify information. 0 0 This network also
should analyze information by standardizing technical data from around
the world,' 0 ' establishing international environmental norms, 0 2 clarifying complex issues for the world public,' 03 correcting misperceptions,"0
and accurately calculating the benefits and costs of environmental regulation.'0 5 In addition, this network must disseminate information by in-

97. See Sands, supra note 72, at 399.
Indeed, the very term "community of states" seems increasingly self-contradictory.
Notions of community suggest a sense of deep, horizontal comradeship among
groups and individuals, growing out of its members' ability to imagine communion
amongst themselves. Traditional notions of sovereignty, territory and state lie uncomfortably with the very idea of community, since they establish a territorial and
proprietary notion of international relations which belies a sense of common interest and common action. Paradoxically, it is precisely non-state actors whose common interests are capable of developing into such powerful bonds, such as people,
corporations and NGOs.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98. See Rosencranz, supra note 37, at 521; see also Nanda, supra note 11, at 376,
389.
99. See K. DAHLBERG, M. SORoos, A. FERARU, J. HARF, & B. TROUT, ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL ARENA

19 (1985) [hereinafter K.

DAHLBERG].

All relevant

information, whether obtained directly or by other organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), should be collected. For a description of WMO, see
Weiss, The International Implications of Seasonal Climate Forecasting, 17 STAN. J.
INT'L L., 315 (1981).
100. See Note, supra note 61, at 279; see also Chayes, supra note 3, at 11. An
environmental data bank could highlight gaps in research and limit costly duplication of
research. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 136.
101. See Clapham, supra note 24, at 34-35; see also Smith, supra note 63, at 349.
102. See Kennan, supra note 2, at 109.
103. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 155; see also J. SCHNEIDER, supra note
55, at 78.
104. See Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 470; see also Hahn & Richards, supra note
41, at 429.
105. See Howard, The Economic Impact, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 41, 42 (1982); see also
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forming and educating the world public." 6 Even significant environmental damage is not visible until the situation becomes extreme, and
therefore, the world public must be convinced to act through education.' O Heightened public awareness could "ameliorate the naive but
still widespread feeling that environmental and development goals are in
fundamental conflict."' 0 8 Direct information and knowledge also could
overcome pervasive apathy' 0 9 and, perhaps, even influence people to alter their individual lifestyles voluntarily to lessen strain on the
environment." 0
People, however, do not assimilate information independent of the
source."' The general public must perceive the information received as
objective and unbiased." 2 Any environmental network that wishes to
earn the public trust should not espouse or affiliate with any national,
x3
political., ethnic, cultural, religious, commercial, or economic interest."
"[E]nvironmental statesmen and diplomats [must be] true international
servants, bound by no national or political mandate, by nothing, in fact,

K. DAHLBERG, supra note 99, at 25. An accurate assessment of costs and benefits must
include the actual cost of environmental regulation balanced against the societal cost of
no environmental regulation, and it must take into account any potential savings or income generated from new environmental protection industries. For example, annual acid
rain damage to European agriculture, industry, and human health is estimated at $13
billion, while the annual costs of pollution control in Europe would be approximately
$6.7 billion. See Comment, supra note 77, at 451; see also Roberts, supra note 16, at 6
(cost to Canadian economy); Howard, supra at 44-45 (discussing Canadian annual acid
rain damage ($285 million), annual United States health costs from sulfur dioxide ($17
billion) and new industries for pollution control). Analysis also might include development of alternative clean technologies. See Note, supra note 61, at 279.
106. See Nanda, supra note 11, at 390; see also L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at
156. While some people are uninformed, see Note, supra note 11, at 389, others suffer
from a cacophony of information, see J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 5.
107. See Nanda, supra note 11, at 381; see also Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 479.
108. Chayes, supra note 3, at 22-23.
109. See Rosencranz, The Law and Politics of Transboundary Air Pollution: The
European Experience, 5 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 102, 102 (1982); see also L. CALDWELL, supra
note 34, at 146.
110. See E. EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME-THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

111.

See S.

COTGROVE,

CATASTROPHIC

173 (1987).

OR

CORNUCOPIA-THE

ENVIRONMENT,

(1982).
112. See Editorial Analysis, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, & THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 169, 175-76 U. Hargrove ed. 1972). For a discussion of other reasons for independent NGOs, see infra Part IV. and accompanying text.
113. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 10-11, 15; see also Skolnikoff, Comments on Professor Chayes' Paper, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, & THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 27, 30
(J.Hargrove ed. 1972).
POLITICS AND THE FUTURE 81
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other than dedication to the work at hand.""' 4 Non-alignment brings
credibility, as exemplified by the prestige bestowed on the International
Red Cross." 5 On the other hand, opinion polls indicate that the general
public perceives government as ineffective and untrustworthy concerning
environmental issues."' The public is also skeptical of industry's concern
for the environment."' Even the United Nations suffers from a credibility gap." 8 Environmental groups, in a manner similar to the Red Cross,
tend to forego political alignment, viewing "environmental protection as
a matter of public interest rising above class and party.""' 9 Accordingly,
environmental NGOs enjoy a high degree of trust and credibility with
the general public. 2
C.

Formation of a Consensus

Any attempts to create an environmental consensus on the international level will be futile without consensus formation at the national
public level. 2' Transnational environmental NGOs are uniquely positioned to stimulate public opinion throughout the world and to focus

114. Kennan, supra note 2, at 113.
115. See Editorial Comment, The InternationalRed Cross Organization, 14 AM. J.
INT'L L. 210, 211 (1920). Non-policymaking bodies, in general, secure greater respect
and an aura of integrity. See Robinson, supra note 51, at 170.

116. See, e.g., McCallum & Covello, What the Public Thinks About Environmental
Data, 15 E.P.A. J. May-June 1989, at 22; see also Environmental Program Offered by
President of Friendsof the Earth, Now in Parliament,10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
4, at 382-83 (Aug. 12, 1987).

117.

See Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at 426; see also THE

FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

A

CONSERVATION
VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES 21

(1987).
118. See Editorial Comment, supra note 53, at 108; see also R. FALK, supra note
23, at 315.
119. S. COTGROVE, supra note 111, at 90. Similarly, the West German Green Party
declares itself neither left nor right, but in front. See Howland, supra note 35, at 23.
Other NGOs also prefer political non-alignment. See Colamosca, Amnesty International

at 20, THE NEw

REPUBLIC,

May 23, 1981, at 13.

120. See L. MILBRATH, ENVIRONMENTALISTS-VANGUARD FOR A NEW SOCIETY
92-93 (1984); see also McCallum & Covello, supra note 116, at 22; Survey Shows Envi-

ronment as Top Issue, but Lack of Confidence in Policy Development, 10 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 667-68 (Dec. 9, 1987).
121. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 228. UNEP Executive Director Mostafa
Tolba declared mounting public pressure to be the planet's source of hope because only
governments, not the United Nations, are accountable to public pressure. See Governing

Council Endorses Blueprintfor Development into Twenty-First Century, 10 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 313-14 (July 8, 1987).
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public pressure within states for global environmental action,"' and they
have begun to make their presence known. 2 ' Moreover, a network of
environmental NGOs could focus the efforts of various NGOs for the
most efficient use and impact of information.
Essentially, movement toward a global environmental consensus requires an informed world citizenry pushing the government toward acceptable environmental policies from below.' 24 NGOs can provide the
information that will help to initiate this chain reaction.' 2 5 "International environmental protection does not require the creation of new in,stitutions; it requires that existing institutions be led to do that which
they have long had the power to do."' 2 6
Ultimately, the pressure from an informed public is translated into
national policy within individual states 2 and culminates with international action.' 2 8 For example, the constant publicity and public concern
about the "hole" in the ozone layer mobilized government action, resulting in the Montreal Protocol. 2 The Montreal Protocol exemplified the
ability of public pressure to force results that government officials had
'
not deemed "necessary or attractive.

130

Once policy objectives are in place, the NGO changes from a promoter
into public watchdog.' 3 ' In this capacity, the NGO exposes infractions of
environmental law or policy to the moral pressure of public opinion as a

122. See Sands, supra note 72, at 394, 401, 411; see also L. CALDWELL, supra note
34, at 76; E. EL-HINNAWI & M. HASHMI, supra note 110, at 174.
123. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at 423, 440; see also Smith, supra note
63, at 344; J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 81. "There is a universal recognition and
acceptance among peoples of an obligation to protect the global heritage for future generations. It is deeply rooted in human behavior and in the religious and cultural norms of
societies." Weiss, supra note 87, at 246.

124. See Editorial Comment, InternationalEnvironmentalAction: The Road After
EARTH L.J. 311, 314-15 (1976); see also W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at
130-31.
125. See J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 127; see also W. FELD & R. JORDAN,
Stockholm, 2

231-32 (2d ed. 1988).
126. Ho, supra note 7, at 247.
127. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at 426, 435, 441-42; see also Austin,

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Environmental Pollution Information-Disclosureand Access, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L.
413, 416 (1989).
128. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 233; see also Hahn & Richards, supra
note 41, at 422, 427-28.
129. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at 435.
130. Id.
131.

(1983).

See P.

LOWE

&

J.

GOYDER,

ENVIRONMENTAL

GROUPS IN POLITICS

35
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sanction, with the goal of encouraging compliance.'" 2 Amnesty International successfully utilizes this approach to induce observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandate by comparing a signatory
33
nation's actual conduct against the spirit of the voluntary Declaration.1
With detailed information about specific violations, Amnesty International can focus world attention and condemnation on a national government by quickly mobilizing worldwide letter-writing campaigns from individual citizens"3 and alerting mass media on a global scale.'3 5 Thus,
with a global consensus in place, the NGO could commence a perpetual
cycle of correction and modification of current practices through the conduit of public opinion.
Regrettably, certain states continue to rely on the fiction of state sovereignty, to the detriment of the world community.' The fiction of state
sovereignty can work to serve humanity only if humans never forget it is
a fiction. Because global environmental action currently operates within,
and therefore is constrained by, state sovereignty, environmental strategies must utilize avenues outside sovereignty to be effective.'13 Existence
beyond the scope of sovereignty, however, need not impinge on sovereignty.'3 " Transnational environmental strategies and the system of state
sovereignty must coexist and should counterbalance each other for the
benefit of the world community.
D. Successful Environmental Groups as Models for a
TransnationalNetwork
Although no global transnational environmental NGO network currently exists, the grassroots environmental movement is vigorous within

132. See Sands, supra note 72, at 415; see also Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at
437-38 (showing that non-binding agreements can be used to bring "moral pressure" to
bear).
133. See Sands, supra note 72, at 416-17; see also Colamosca, supra note 119, at 15.
Note that even though Amnesty International can act as a "watchdog" in upholding the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an environmental network still can expose environmental degradation to the world without a formal environmental agreement. Nevertheless, such an agreement would give more force to any sanctions and should continue to
be the goal of a transnational environmental network.
134. See Durrell, The Conscience of Amnesty, 4 CAN. LAW., Oct. 1980, at 21, 23.
135. See Colamosca, supra note 119, at 15.
136. See Howland, supra note 35, at 29.
137. Id. The sovereignty of states "is only half the equation. Without energetic action and cooperation from and among environmental organizations and governments, ...
multilateral bodies will become dead institutions." R. FALK, supra note 23, at 324.
138. See Editorial Comment, supra note 124, at 315.
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several states. Groups that have been created around this movement provide an insight into future creation of a transnational network. In addition, the existence of these groups indicates that the people within the
international community are ready to address environmental issues on a
global scale.
The most dramatic example of transnational grassroots activity for the
environment is the Green movement in Europe." 9 The Green movement
covers much of Western Europe and is gaining support. 4" This group
was instrumental in West Germany's radical reorientation during the
early 1980s, in the face of ecological collapse in the famed Black Forest. " Within a single decade, the West German Green Party transformed West Germany from an industrial powerhouse, skeptical of environmental regulation, into an aggressive international proponent for the
environment.' 42 The West German Green Party, formed by the merger
of several environmentalist groups operating at the local level, used the
political process to voice concerns about the nation's forests. 143 As a result, the West German Greens had won twenty-seven seats in the national legislature at the time of reunification," and Petra Kelly, one of
the Green Party's principal leaders, was a member of the German
Parliament.' 4 5

Arguably, grassroots movements could be limited to industrialized or
Western democracies. Even in authoritarian and developing nations,
however, hope exists. Socialist ideology, for example, is not antithetical
to potential grassroots environmentalism. Socialist doctrine champions
the "betterment of society"' 46 and the "well-being of people."'14 7 The
Soviet Constitution charges citizens of the Soviet Union with protection

139. Hill, A Management Job for the Human Race, 15 E.P.A. J., July-Aug. 1989,
at 4, 5-6.
140. Id.; see also French Green Party Posts Major Gains in Electionsfor Mayoral,
Council Seats, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 185-85 (Apr. 12, 1989); Social
Democrats, Reacting to Success of Greens, Eye Tougher Pollution Controls, 10 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 387 (Aug. 12, 1987).
141. See On the Brink of an Ecological Calamity, supra note 81, at 325-26.
142. Id. at 331-33, 339-42.
143. Id. at 332.
144. Id.
145. See How We Can Save It, 15 GREENPEACE at 4, 5 (Jan./Feb. 1990).
146. Garcia & Howland, supra note 49, at 72.
147. See Kolbasov, Legal Protection of the Environment in the USSR, 1 EARTH L.J.
51, 51 (1975). "In order to be consistent with socialist ideology, both the costs and the
benefits of protection should be shared equally by all in society." Garcia & Howland,
supra note 49, at 76.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

of the environment.1

[Vol 23.1057

48

The primary purpose of citizen participation in the Soviet Union is
educating the public, 149 although the All Russian Society for the Protection of Nature (All Russian Society), the most significant environmental
organization in the Soviet Union, 50 has a statutory right to advance
comment on government regulations. 1 5' Because major voluntary environmental societies, like the All Russian Society, are chartered officially
by the Soviet government,"' many in the West dismiss these groups as
"window dressing" by the Soviet government.' 5 3 United States environmentalists, nonetheless, describe the work of Soviet environmental groups
as impressive.1 4 Several "official" environmental groups, together with
non-environmental groups, successfully pressured the Soviet government
to cancel a river diversion project of the Siberian River because of the
55
gravity of potential ecological damage.1
Under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost,'5 6 informal independent groups are emerging and receiving media attention, with a publicity-conscious style similar to Western counterparts. 7 Unofficial envi148. See Futrell, Public Participation in Soviet Environmental Poliy, 5 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 489 (1988); see also Kolbasov, supra note 147, at 54. The Soviet
Constitution states:
In the interests of the present and future generations the necessary steps are taken
in the USSR to protect and make scientific, rational use of the land and its mineral and water resources, and the planet and animal kingdoms, to preserve the
purity of air and water, ensure reproduction of natural wealth, and improve the
human environment.
SOVIET CONST., art. 18, reprinted in Futrell, supra at 489. For a similar discussion of
Cuban environmental law, see Garcia & Howland, supra note 49.
149. See Futrell, supra note 148, at 488.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 501. "This has been compared to the circulation of a rule or regulation
by an American administrative agency with a request for comments." Id. For a more
detailed discussion of the All Russian Society's activities, see Yost, The Citizens' Role in
Nature Protection in the U.S.S.R., 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50051 (Aug.
1981).
152. See Tarnavskii, Law and Voluntary Nature Conservation in the USSR, 4
CONN. J. INT'L L. 369, 375 (1989).
153. See Futrell, supra note 148, at 491.
154. Id. at 499.
155. See HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 167-68; see also Futrell,
supra note 148, at 504.
156. Gorbachev stated that "[w]e must expand publicity, things must be more open,
our people should be aware of everything that takes place in the labor collective, in the
region, the city, the province, and the country as a whole." Tarnavskii, supra note 152,
at 374.
157. See Futrell, supra note 148, at 504-05; see also Tarnavskii, supra note 152, at
378,
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ronmental movements, however, existed before glasnost.15 Inspired by
West Germany's Green Party,' 5 9 these Soviet ecological movements
gained momentum after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 6 ' and now are
becoming visible to the West. Armed with information from Western
media 6' or from simply observing the condition of the environment, 6 2
these groups are beginning to command the attention of the Soviet government.'6 Despite political attempts to block the transfer of information,' new technologies increasingly render information barriers either
ineffective or economically infeasible.' 5 Thus, "even highly authoritarian governments have been forced to take steps to correct [environmental] problem[s] by instituting pollution controls or by cancelling or modifying development projects."' 6 6
Developing nations are experiencing a similar growth in activity by
environmental NGOs,' 6 7 with a parallel growth in public environmental
awareness.' 8 The perception is fading that NGOs were only another

158. See HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 163.
159. See id. at 18-22, 59-69, 90-95, 163-66 (discussing environmental movements in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union).
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Id. at 171, 186.
162. See Tarnavskii, supra note 152, at 371-72; see also Mitchell, How "Soft,"
"Deep," or "Left?" Present Constituenciesin the Environmental Movement for Certain
World Views, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345, 355 (1980).
163. See Tarnavskii, supra note 152, at 371-73; see also HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra note 1, at 167. These environmental groups now are establishing networks
with each other and Western counterparts. Estonian Group Joins Friends of Earth at
FirstEast-West Environmental Summit, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 610-11
(Nov. 9, 1988); see also Voordouw, Open Learning and Team-Working: A Perspective
From the Youth Organisations,in NEw IDEAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 93 (S.
Bricefio & D. Pitts, eds. 1988); U.S. EnvironmentalistsVisitors to U.S.S.R. Find Greens
Movement Gaining Strength There, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 236 (May 10,
1989).
164. See J. SCHNEIDER, supra note 55, at 78.
165. See Nye & Keohane, supra note 92, at 743; see also Sands, supra note 72, at
400. New technology can also aid in information gathering. Seismic monitoring of large
disturbances in the ground can verify the occurrence of underground nuclear testing. See
Greenpeace Action, Campaign For a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Information Brochure). Hopefully, the recent improvements in East-West relations will remove obstacles
to the transfer of information. See Howland, supra note 35, at 37.
166. Leonard & Morell, supra note 43, at 291.
167. See Smith, supra note 63, at 344; see also Leonard & Morell, supra note 43, at
291.
168. See Leonard & Morell, supra note 43, at 286, 290; see also Sinjela, supra note
43, at 502. NGOs are more knowledgeable about the issues facing developing nations.
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imposition of Western culture as NGOs champion the needs of developing nations.' 9 The resultant heightened awareness of environmental
problems has mobilized the public 170 and influenced government decision-making on development projects. 17 ' Developing nations are realizing
that environmental concern does not conflict with economic development,
but rather they are necessarily linked because " 'economic development'
without due regard to environmental factors can end up robbing a country of the very basics of life itself.

IV.

'172

A PROPOSAL FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK

A.

Environmental Authority Network

Environmental NGOs are appearing throughout the world. Sihce the
scope of environmental problems is global, these groups must act in concert to maximize mobilization of the people and governments of the
world. This section sets forth guidelines for one method of aligning the
efforts of NGOs to produce rapid and objective results without the political restrictions of the current sovereignty system.
An Environmental Authority Network, composed of transnational
NGOs and unfettered by sovereignty or legislative constituencies, could
operate to influence states without infringing upon their sovereignty. 73
Recent Development, The First World Industry Conference on EnvironmentalManagement: A Giant Step Toward Environmental Excellence, 1 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J.
133, 145 (1985).
169. See D. WILLIAMS, supra note 58, at 263-64.
170. See Leonard & Morell, supra note 43, at 294-96.
171, Id. at 293, 297; see also Recent Development, supra note 20, at 508-09. For
example, "[e]ven though the Irish government had been willing to become a 'dust bin' for
Europe and the United States, growing popular awareness helped to prevent this" destructive development strategy. Id. at 299. "[Tihe Irish Industrial Development Authority has cited environmental concern as the reason for discouraging a number of industrial
inquiries regarding the possible location of new plants in Ireland." Id.
172. Sinjela, supra note 43, at 499-501.
173. See R. FALK, supra note 23, at 325; see also P. LOWE & J. GOYDER, supra
note 131, at 85.
All of this would seem to speak for the establishment of a single entity which,
while not duplicating the work of existing organizations, could review this work
from the standpoint of man's environmental needs as a whole, could make it its
task to spot the inadequacies and identify the unfilled needs, could help to keep the
governments and leaders of opinion informed as to what ought to be done to meet
minimum needs, could endeavor to assure that proper rules and standards are
established wherever they are needed, and could, where desired, take a hand, vigorously and impartially, in the work of enforcement of rules and standards. It
would not have to perform all these various functions itself-except perhaps where
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Network membership should be limited to private nonprofit organizations," 4 with "equitable geographical representation."' 5 Dividing the
globe into quadrants, transnational membership standards should require that participants in the Network, as organizations, have a membership consisting of private individuals representing each quadrant with
no more than fifty percent of total membership residing in any single
quadrant. 7 6 This quadrant system should prevent individual nations
and regional international organizations from obtaining Network membership by masquerading as environmental NGOs.
The Network should have several primary functions. Its most important responsibilities would be to act as an informational clearinghouse by
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data for public consumption. 7
The Network also should coordinate current research and experimental
activities concerning environmental issues.' In addition, it should monitor the current state of the global environment. 7 9 Another important
task for the Network is establishing universal criteria and standards for
environmental protection.'" In addition, the Network could formulate
an environmental alert system of advance warnings for environmental
hazards' 8 ' or investigate environmental problems and develop solutions
or options.' 2 Training environmental researchers 8 3 and advising governmental officials' 84 are other functions the Network might consider.
Further, the Network might choose to adopt the Declaration
on the
Human Environment85 or the World Charter for Nature'86 as an as-

there was no one else to do so. Its responsibility should be rather to define their
desirable dimensions and to exert itself, and use its influence with governments, to
the end that all of them were performed by someone, and in an adequate way.
Id.
Interestingly, an independent Soviet peace organization also has advocated monitoring
governmental performance with an NGO Network. HELSINKI WATCH REPORT, supra
note 1, at 242.
174. See K. DAHLBERG, supra note 99, at 51-52.
175. Gunter, supra note 65, at 567.
176. Europe and North America could not be assigned to the same quadrant without
barring membership to the most powerful environmental NGOs currently in operation.
177. See Recent Development, supra note 168, at 149; see also L. CALDWELL, supra
note 34, at 170.
178. See Kennan, supra note 2, at 109.
179. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 170.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Kennan, supra note 2, at 115.
185. See Robinson, supra note 51, at 61-62.
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pirational guideline or as a gauge in the manner that Amnesty International uses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 7
The Network might perform other secondary functions as well. The
Network could, upon request, devise environmental impact statements
for the public record,"' 8 or highlight gaps in current research .that need
further study.' 9 The Network also may arbitrate environmental disputes,1 90 negotiate exchanges between parties, such as the "debt-for-nature" swaps, to encourage conservation in developing nations,'' determine ecological standards for sustainable development,9 2 and advise and
support local environmental NGOs to further facilitate the dissemination
of information as well as encourage public involvement.' 9 3 In addition,
the Network might conduct speaking tours, host environmental summits
and conferences,19 4 and advise government and industry officials on environmental matters.' 9 5 Another function of the Network may be recognition of environmentally sound products or environmental accomplishments by members of industry with official environmental product tags
or emblems to identify and encourage consumer support for environmen-

186. G.A. Res. 7, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/51 (1982).
See generally Wood, The United Nations World Charterfor Nature: The Developing
Nations' Initiative to Establish Protectionsfor the Environment, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 977

(1985).
187. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
188. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 20; see also Robinson, supra note 51, at 248-49.
189. See, e.g., Lynch & Talbott, Legal Responses to the Philippine'Deforestation
Crises, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679, 710-12 (1988).
190. See Note, supra note 61, at 281.
191. See, e.g., Lynch & Talbott, supra note 189, at 709-10; see also International
Group Buys Some Foreign Debt in Swap for Creation of Conservation Areas, 10 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 388 (Aug. 12, 1987); Costa Rica, Setting for IUCN Meeting, Reflects Strong Commitment to Conservation, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at
170-71 (Mar. 9, 1988); Uhlig, Mexican' Debt Deal May Save Jungle, N.Y. Times, Feb.
26, 1991, at A3, col.1.
192. Sustainable development is "development that is compatible with environmental
stability in the long run." Handl, supra note 4, at 606.
193. See Leonard & Morell, supra note 43, at 310. Environmental activism can help
to ameliorate feelings of powerlessness that pervade society. See S. COTGROVE, supra
note 111, at 79; L. MILBRATH, supra note 120, at 87.
194. See, e.g., L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 172-73; Recent Development, supra
note 168, at 133.
195. The Network could aid in the decision-making process, see K. DAHLBERG,
supra note 99, at 52; review contracts, see Leonard, ConfrontingIndustrialPollution in
Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities, 12 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 779, 800 (1985); and counsel litigants, see Sands, supra note 72, at 416.

1991]

TRANSNATIONAL ALIGNMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs

1081

tally aware companies.'" 6 The Network should concentrate on its function as an environmental leader, rather than becoming involved in politics or diplomacy. 9
A critical issue will be funding the Network without compromising
impartiality.19 Generally, funding diversification can protect credibility." 9 The Network must obtain funding cautiously and publicly to
maintain the perception of impartiality. 0 0 Direct funding could be limited to dues and other funds obtained by Network NGOs from the private membership within their individual organizations.2 0 ' Direct funding
could be supplemented by a single community donation fund consisting
of all other private, public, and corporate contributions. 0 2 The Network
also might generate income from selling publications, offering training

196. See Recent Development, supra note 168, at 145; see, e.g., Council of European
Communities Second Action Program on the Environment, May 17, 1977, tit. IV, ch. 5,
sec. (e), reprinted in 2 Reference File, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 131:0301, 131:0325
(1978).
Some groups already have begun to provide this service. Green Seal, Inc., "the first
national, independent, nonprofit environmental-labeling organization," recently was instituted to assist environmentally conscientious consumers in their purchasing decisions.
The Green Seal organization will soon allow manufacturers to identify "environmentally
preferable [household] products" with a seal of approval that "will help to eliminate
consumer confusion about the validity of [manufacturers'] environmental claims." The
Debut of Green Seal, HUMANE Soc'Y U.S. NEWS, Winter 1991, at 2, col. 1. In 1990,
one of the first environmental product symbols was awarded by Green Cross Certification Company (Green Cross) in conjunction with the EPA; to "products made from or
packaged in the highest possible percentage of recycled material." Freeman, Ecology
Seals Vie for Approval, ADVERTISING AGE 30, 30 (Jan. 29, 1991). Environmentalists
and legislators currently are debating whether these labeling efforts should emanate from
the private sector, like Green Seal, rather than government-backed legislation like Green
Cross. Goroboil, Bill Aimed At Identifying Environmentally Safe Products Gannet
News Service, Feb. 4, 1991 (LExIs, Nexis library, Currnt file).
197. See R. FALK, supra note 23, at 321.
198. Antrobus, Fundingfor NGOs: Issues & Options, 15 WORLD DEv. 95, 97 (Autumn Supp. 1987); see also Drabek, Development Alternatives: The Challenge for
NGOs-An Overview of the Issues, 15 WORLD DEv. ix, xiii (Autumn Supp. 1987).

199. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 173; see also Heijden, The Reconciliation
of NGO Autonomy, ProgramIntegrity and OperationalEffectiveness with Accountability to Donors, 15 WORLD DEV. 103, 106 (Autumn Supp. 1987).
200. See Antrobus, supra note 198, at 97; see also Drabek, supra note 198, at xiii.
201. See L. MILBRATH, supra note 120, at 74; see also Heijden, supra note 199, at
110.
202. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 63, at 342. Some donations might be in kind, such
as media donations of printspace or broadcast time. For a discussion of the importance of
media exposure, see Hahn & Richards, supra note 41, at 426-27.
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services, and consulting.203
B.

Sources of Legitimacy

Transnational NGOs have begun to focus on global action,2" 4 but the
creation of more than one NGO network could further confuse the people and governments of the world. Although any global action, no matter
how factionalized, will be superior to none, the legitimacy of one particular network, as distinguished from other networks, would lead to more
efficient action by the NGOs and more respect for the network from the
world community. This legitimacy can be derived from several sources,
but it is important that these sources recognize, rather than control, the
network. Recognition would allow the network to remain independent of
the concerns of individual sovereign states, and yet the network could act
to streamline global environmental efforts.
The United Nations is the most prestigious and obvious source of endowment for an Environmental Authority Network. By endorsing or acknowledging by resolution the Network's existence as an independent
entity, the United Nations could stamp the Network as the "instrumentality to which the international community looks" for environmental
leadership and guidance. 05 Precedent for international endorsement of
an independent NGO by an intergovernmental entity exists in the
League of Nations recognition by resolution of the International Red
Cross.20 ' The Network would continue to exist and operate independently of the United Nations, just as the International Red Cross always
has operated, as an independent NGO.
A more typical method of legitimizing a network would be an international agreement establishing or endorsing an independent environmental
network.207 Although states may not have confidence in each other, or
themselves as a group, to put nationhood aside for the benefit of the
international community, 08 they may trust an independent third party,

203. See Antrobus, supra note 198, at 100.
204. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
205. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 15-16.
206. The International Red Cross was recognized for "purposes [of] the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the
world." Editorial Comment, supra note 115, at 213-14.
207. An example of such an agreement would be the Cape Spartel Lighthouse International Commission. This commission created a lighthouse off the coast of Northern
Africa necessary for the safe travel of member nations' ships arounds a dangerous coastline. See Current Note, The InternationalLighthouse at Cape Spartel, 34 AM. J. INT'L
L. 770 (1930).
208. It is doubtful, however, whether states will find a nongovernmental defender of
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with no other interests than the task at hand, to advance impartially the
interests of the environment. Hopefully, the opportunity to encourage
both respect for a healthy environment and observance of current treaty
obligations" 9 will outweigh the risk of international condemnation from
any potential infractions of such an agreement.
Individual states can avoid committing to potentially undesirable consequences by making a declaration of international recognition rather
than a binding obligation, and even minimal infringement on sovereignty, as permitting the transfer of information across national boundaries, remains voluntary.2 10 The flexibility of a non-binding agreement is
more politically palatable,2 ' especially when national leaders can get
credit for environmental action. Even such an agreement between a
handful of the major Western industrial nations would be progress. Not
only do these nations compose the forefront of the environmental movement2 12 and have considerable influence among other nations,2 13 they
also combine to inflict the greatest harm on the global environment.2"4
Eventually, once sovereign states have joined a voluntary international
agreement on the environment, "participation in such endeavors becomes
a privilege and a necessity. The effective sanction in this area of nonbinding international law is that of 'non-participation,' exclusion from
common endeavors and facilities.121 5 One environmental success story is
the International Convention for the Protection and Rational Management of Fur Seals in the Bering Sea,2"" a co-operative agreement between Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. This
non-binding convention exemplifies "sustained yield management" because each party has a continuing interest in the success of the
program.2' 7
Nonetheless, NGOs do not require the approbation of governmental
or intergovernmental entities to form the Environmental Authority Net-

the environment to be in their own self-interest, no matter how unobtrusive on sovereignty the Network might be. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 16.
209. See Sands, supra note 72, at 417.
210. Technology quite possibly could render any attempted interference with information transfers meaningless.
211. See W. GORMLEY, supra note 31, at 222-23.
212. See Robinson, supra note 51, at 233.
213. See Public Attitudes Toward Nature Said Important Base for Conservation
Legislation, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 342 (July 8, 1987).
214. Id.
215. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 30, at 369.
216. See L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 61-63.
217. L. CALDWELL, supra note 34, at 61-62.
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work. NGOs may always voluntarily create their own network. Ample
evidence exists that NGO networking already has begun.2" 8 Establishing
international recognition of an environmental authority for the world
community in this manner, however, will exact a great expenditure of
the most precious resource of all, time.
V.

CONCLUSION

Operating outside the confines of national sovereignty, an environmental NGO network would be a palatable alternative to more radical
change and would allow for more immediate action on behalf of the environment. The narrow and intense focus of the network would act as a
catalyst for the proper functioning of the existing international system.
Conceivably, through mechanisms like the Environmental Authority
Network, the United Nations eventually might find itself fully counterbalanced on all significant issues, such as world hunger and overpopulation, by an independent, transnational, function-based forum outside the
sphere of sovereignty. The United Nations then would be forced to face
a transnational representation of the human race in a "forum of the
219
world's conscience.
Maria Garner

218.

See Garilao, Indigenous NGOs as Strategic Institutions: Managing the Rela-

tionship with Government and Resource Agencies, 15 WORLD DEv. 113, 116 (Autumn
Supp. 1987); see also Grassroots Campaign Aims at Winning Support for Measures to
Protect Earth's Ozone Layer, 12 Int'l Ent'l Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 244 (May 10, 1989);
Activists Plan Global Mobilization to Campaign on Greenhouse Concerns, 11 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 595 (Nov. 9, 1988).
219.

J. STONE, QUEST FOR SURVIVAL 97 (1961).

